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ABSTRACT 
The search, detection, identification and assessment components of the U.S. Navy’s 
organic modular in-stride Mine Countermeasure (MCM) Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS) have been evaluated for their effectiveness as part of a hypothetical 
exercise in response to the existence of sea mines placed in the sea lanes of the Strait 
of Hormuz. The current MCM CONOPS has been shown to be capable of supporting 
the mine search and detection effort component allocation needs by utilizing two 
Airborne Mine Countermeasure (AMCM) deployed systems. This adequacy 
assessment is tenuous. The CONOPS relies heavily upon the Sikorsky MH-60/S as 
the sole platform from which the systems operate. This reliance is further 
compounded by the fact both AMCM systems are not simultaneously compatible on 
board the MH-60/S. As such, resource availability will challenge the MCM 
CONOPS as well as the other missions for which the MH-60/S is intended. 
Additionally, the AMCM CONOPS systems are dependent upon the presence of 
warfighters in the helicopters above the minefield and as integral participants in the 
efforts to identify sea mines and to assess their threat level. Model Based System 
Engineering (MBSE) techniques have been combined with research and stakeholder 
inputs in an analysis that supports these assertions.  
 vi
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The USN and expeditionary Marine forces need an unmanned capability to 
rapidly and effectively locate mines and UWIED’s in littoral waterways in a cost 
effective and timely manner that meets the following criteria: 
 Must be organic and modularly integrated into the capabilities of the task 
force units in need of MCM. 
 Must be able to get the war-fighter and expensive major assets out of the 
minefield during the MCM operations. 
The results of this project provide a “fresh look” at the current CONOPS intended 
to be served by the MCM Mission Modules under development for the LCS. MBSE 
techniques were applied to vet the current CONOPS in response to the mission of 
searching for and detecting sea mines placed in the Strait of Hormuz. 
From the fresh look, the following conclusions are presented. 
 The Strait of Hormuz provides an ideal and relevant setting for the evaluation 
of the performance of an MCM CONOPS.  
 Comparison of the search and detection functional requirements as derived 
from the Strait of Hormuz DRM to the U.S. Navy’s current MCM CONOPS 
components reveals the CONOPS to be both resource and technology limited. 
 MCM search, detection, identification, and threat assessment activities must 
be less reliant upon human operators as integral information processors.  
The above conclusions support the larger conclusion that a new CONOPS 
employing a combination of the older MCM platforms in conjunction with the new 
AMCM systems could achieve the same results with less uncertainty. The current 
CONOPS requires 55 LCS hulls each equipped with two MH-60/S helicopters.  
 LCS production delays could be augmented through the utilization of Arleigh 
Burke class destroyers or amphibious assault ships (i.e., LHAs or LHDs) 
assuming enough MH-60/S helicopters were available. 
 The larger CH-53 helicopters deployed from LHAs and LHDs could perform 
a portion of the AMCM mission, if the MH-60/S helicopters were not 
available in sufficient quantities. 
The report concludes with recommendations for future work. 
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I. INTRODUCTION/PROBLEM STATEMENT  
The mine warfare Concept of Operations (CONOPS) currently employed by the 
United States Navy (USN) is in the process of being overhauled. The existing 
deployment of dedicated mine countermeasures (MCM) ships and equipment is intended 
to be replaced through the utilization of a new class of multi-mission ships equipped with 
two multipurpose helicopters (the Sikorsky SH-60/S). Additionally, the MCM detection 
equipment is being changed out from older mine hunting sonar (AN/AQS-24) to the still 
developmental AN/AQS-20A system. Lastly, a new technology has been developed to 
search for and detect untethered mines located at the surface and submerged at near 
surface depths for which the use of sonar is not effective. This CONOPS is currently in 
excess of fifteen years old since its inception; during that period, many of the planned 
MCM systems for both detecting and neutralizing have not materialized to support the 
modular mission format envisioned for the application of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 
platforms. 
Current geopolitical circumstances may dictate the practical need for MCM 
efforts by the U.S. Navy over the coming years, well in advance of implementing the 
modular LCS CONOPS. At present, the threat of Iran to mine the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) 
represents a very real and pressing example of the need outpacing our preparedness. This 
study is presented as an un-biased evaluation of the capabilities needed to perform the 
detection portion of MCM efforts. By utilizing a combination of Model Based Systems 
Engineering (MBSE) techniques to examine the mine detection combined with an 
independent outsiders’ vantage, significant obstacles to the realization of the Navy’s 
CONOPS have been found. These obstacles and the challenges that they pose are 
presented to the reader in the hopes that, through awareness of them, the Navy’s 
CONOPS can be realized and utilized to meet the developing pressing needs 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT (PRIMITIVE NEED) 
The United States Navy and expeditionary Marine forces need to locate and clear 
Mines and Under Water Improvised Explosive Devices (UWIEDs) from littoral areas 
both at home and abroad. 
B. BOUNDED PROBLEM STATEMENT (EFFECTIVE NEED) 
The USN and expeditionary Marine forces need an unmanned capability to 
rapidly and effectively locate mines and UWIED’s in littoral waterways in a cost 
effective and timely manner that meets the following criteria: 
 Must be organic and modularly integrated into the capabilities of the task 
force units in need of MCM. 
 Must be able to get the war-fighter and expensive major assets out of the 
minefield during the MCM operations. 
C. PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
MBSE approaches will be utilized to explore the definition of a system capable of 
meeting the bounded need statement of providing an autonomous organic capability to 
U.S. Naval and Expeditionary forces operating within littoral waterways. 
D. VALUE ADDED 
The results of this project will provide a “fresh look” at the current CONOPS 
intended to be served by the MCM Mission Modules under development for the LCS. To 
perform the effort, modeling will be applied to vet the current CONOPS in response to 
the mission of searching for and detecting sea mines placed in the Strait of Hormuz. It is 
hoped that the DRM developed will be used and expanded to enable the Navy’s MCM 
CONOPS effectiveness.  
E. BACKGROUND AND RELEVANCY TO THE UNITED STATES 
INTERESTS 
1. Current Status 
Mine warfare in the USN is in a period of change, both in terms of operational 
concepts and in terms of development and fielding of assets. The USN is moving away 
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from a dedicated fleet of MCM vessels and helicopters towards an organic and modular 
concept of integrating MCM into the capabilities of task force units to provide in-stride 
mine countermeasures for theatre access and force protection in the littorals. Another 
major driver in the transformation is the intention to get the sailor and expensive major 
assets out of the minefield during MCM operations. (Jane’s Underwater Warfare Systems 
posted 23–Nov–2009) 
Currently, the USN operates an aging fleet of dedicated MCM Vessels (MCMV) 
of the Avenger Class. The MCMV have been augmented through the use of helicopter 
towed sonar systems deployed from amphibious assault aircraft carriers (LHD-3) as well 
as DDG class destroyers (DDG-91 forward). 
In keeping with the stated criteria of the need statement above, “A major element 
in the USN’s drive to provide in-stride MCM capabilities to task force assets is the 
development of an MCM package for the planned 55 Littoral Combat Ships optimized 
for operations near the shore in support of surface strike groups.” (Jane’s Underwater 
Warfare Systems posted 23-Nov-2009). The LCS mission modules are intended to 
employ Sikorsky MH-60/S Sea Hawk helicopter providing Airborne Mine 
Countermeasure (AMCM) capability by towing either the Raytheon AQS-20A or the 
Northrop Grumman AQs-24A towed mine hunting sonar. 
The second criteria to get the warfighter out of the minefield during MCM 
operations was proposed to be answered by the WLD-1(V)1 Remote Mine hunting 
System (RMS) as a separate MCM mission package under development for use on the 
LCS platforms. The RMS is a diesel powered semi-submersible that tows the AQS-20 
VDS to detect, localize and classify bottom mines and moored mines; the data gathered 
by the AQS-20A is relayed back to the parent vessel using line of sight or over the 
horizon real-time data links. The RMS system reliability has not met requirements 
(Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, 2008). 
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2. Historical Context 
Following the Second World War, United States Naval Forces have suffered 
twenty attacks from five different methods of attack.  The vast majority of the losses were 
due to mines and/or UWIED’s.  Figure 1 lays out by method of attack all the attacks on 
U.S. ships from WWII to 2000.  
 
Figure 1. U.S. Ship Casualties, from (USNPEOLMW, 2009) 
…larger mines can be placed surreptitiously in channels and harbors to 
achieve spectacular effects-against, for example, the Staten Island Ferry, 
crammed with 2,500 commuters during and evening rush hour, or a cruise 
ship with four thousand vacationers and crew on board leaving Miami or 
Seattle. The tragedy of hundreds of bodies floating in a port would 
intensify the psychological message about the true security of America’s 
home waters. (Truver 2008) 
Truver (2008) also states that the economic impact to the United States and 
foreign trade markets could be substantial: 
Mines can directly attack the nation’s waterborne trade. More than 90 
percent of American exports and imports by volume transits U.S. ports, 
and the efficient and safe movement of our foreign, coastal, and inland-
waters trades is critical for America’s globalized, just-in-time, and just-
enough economy. The economic consequences of just a few mines in our 
ports could be catastrophic, as the two-week West Coast labor slowdown 
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in the fall of 2002 implies—a $1.95 billion impact per day. According to a 
University of California at Berkeley analysis, the direct and indirect 
economic impacts of a twenty-day longshoremen’s work action would 
cost the U.S. economy more than $50 billion (in 2002 dollars). Even if no 
ships were sunk or damaged and no channels were blocked, explosions in 
a few key ports on East, Gulf, and West coasts and in the Saint Lawrence 
Seaway— clearly not an impossible feat, as September 11th tragically 
proved—would have a chilling effect on commercial shipping in terms of 
increased insurance costs and vessel lay days. The economic tremors 
would reverberate throughout the nation and to trading partners overseas. 
(Truver 2008) 
The geopolitical potential for the use of mines and UWIED’s is potentially 
limitless to rogue and terrorist nations intent on changing the current balance of 












Figure 2. Potential regions of concern from (Naval Studies Board, 2001) 
The Taiwan Strait represents an area that the Chinese have claimed as territorial 
waters; the use of mines and UWIEDs could effectively close the straight and enable 
Mainland China to effectively swallow (essentially annex) the island of Taiwan. The 
mining of the Korea Strait could isolate the key industrial South Korean city of Ulsan 
depriving an ally of needed resources. The Strait of Malacca is a major sea trade route; 
blocking it could result in significant global economic impact. Blocking the Strait of 
Malacca and the waterway between Singapore and the main island of Indonesia would 
force all shipping traffic through the Java, Celebes, and Flores Seas which have 
historically been stalking grounds for piracy. Lastly, and equally relevant for its’ recent  
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history during the 1987 Tanker War, the Strait of Hormuz represents tremendous regional 
potential for the rogue nation of Iran to hold a large portion of the world’s energy source 
hostage through the utilization of mines and UWIEDs. 
The problems posed by mines and the means to meet the effective need are 
explored in the following pages of this report by applying system engineering principles 
and practices to define and then dissect, through decomposition, the mine search, 
detection, identification, and assessment activities of the larger MCM mission to create a 
requirements driven set of discrete functions against which to compare the current U.S. 
Navy’s CONOPS components. This functional definition and dissection starts with a 
stakeholder analysis and description of sea mines and environmental conditions presented 
by the mission. The use of sea mines to close or disrupt oil tanker traffic through the 
Strait of Hormuz has been chosen as a Design Reference Mission. This high visibility 
scenario will be used as a stress test to generate functional requirements. By allocating 
the U.S. Navy’s MCM CONOPS components to the DRM derived requirements, an 
operational analysis will be performed and conclusions/recommendations for the Navy’s 
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II. SYSTEM ENGINEERING APPROACH AND PROBLEM 
DEFINITION 
A. SYSTEM ENGINEERING OVERVIEW 
System Engineering is the integration of design, manufacture, and maintenance of 
complex and multidisciplinary systems within evolving constraints.  The system 
engineering process helps breakdown this undertaking to manageable levels, in a manner 
that combines best practices from management and engineering efforts.    The structured, 
quantifiable approach to solving problems allows for a myriad of possible solutions and 
for all players to have input into both the synthesis and analysis of the effort.  
The system engineering process is widely utilized and a number of philosophies 
have emerged to define this ever evolving methodology.  However, most processes can 
be broken down into similar components: a requirements definition and analysis phase, a 
system design phase, an implementation and component testing phase, integration and 
system testing phase, and total system launch with performance assessment phase.  For 
the Mine Safety Detection System (MSDS) project, the development of the left side of 
the VEE was the focus. The system engineering process was tailored to execute the 
Modeling and Simulation efforts ahead of Component Design and performed as the 
means by which System Analysis and Architecting were conducted. A recursive process 
was used to refine the system requirements, analysis, and architecture which further 
refined the modeling efforts.  While the required capabilities for components were 
investigated; no component design was undertaken. The development of system 
requirements was conducted via research and stakeholder analyses. System analysis and 
System Architecting were performed through the utilization of functional decomposition 
and data processing models primarily using CORE and performance evaluation using 
Microsoft Excel. Although the Classic VEE shown in Figure 3 represents the entire 
system engineering process up through verification and validation along the right side of 
the VEE, the MSDS steps for the left side were iteratively verified and validated through 




Figure 3. The Classic System Engineering VEE from (Muehlbach, 2012) 
B. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
1. Stakeholder Analysis  
Efforts to address the issues associated with underwater mine detection have 
primarily been conducted by the USN. Many other entities are directly and indirectly 
affected by the presence and consequences of underwater mines. The entities are 
essentially stakeholders who have vested interests in the development of a solution to the 
problem. Table 1 and Table 2 divide the stakeholders into two groups; active and passive. 
Active indicates interaction by the stakeholder with the system during deployment and 
operation; passive indicates interaction outside of operation of the system but may 














Stakeholder Role Concerns 
System Operator System doesn’t require much input as it is to be 
autonomous 
 Is reliable/performing enough to save lives 
 When operator input is required the system is easy to use 
 System is safe to use 
U.S. Navy System cost for design, production, integration and 
maintenance is reasonable 
 System is modular/adaptable to future platforms 
 System has suitable performance 
 System requirements 
System Maintainers System integrates with existing maintenance 
requirements, patterns and practices 
 System does not add significant burden to existing 
maintenance procedures 














Stakeholder Role Concerns 
Taxpayer System has minimal cost and maximizes investment value 
 System follows Government acquisition policies/guidance 
 System performance is accountable/trackable (via metrics) 
Program Manager/Executive 
Command 
System has minimal impact on original mission load (is mostly 
autonomous) 
 System reports status/health/state to centralized control 
 Can be manually overridden 
 Cost, Schedule and Performance 
Intel Community Accurate reporting 
 System design follows well established security procedures 
Joint Forces Command System shares threats/possible impacts with external agencies 
 System ingests threat/possible impacts tracked by other agencies 
 System is interoperable with existing defense/tracking systems 
System Trainers System operation, installation and maintenance integrate into 
existing training regimen 
 Existing training staff can teach system operation 
 System documentation follows existing training standards 
System Designers/Architects There is sufficient data from stakeholders for developing 
requirements and proper system integration 
 System design follows industry best practices 
Contractors Requirements are clearly defined and achievable 
 Program remains funded throughout the development 
System Evaluators Requirements are testable/measurable 
Table 2. Passive Stakeholders 
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2. Operational Resource Flow Diagrams 
In order to understand what information each stakeholder inputs into the system 
and receives from the system an OV-2 or operational resource flow diagram was 
developed. This diagram depicts the high level information inputs and outputs for each 
passive and active stakeholder defined in Table 1 and Table 2.  To delineate the two types 
of stakeholders Figure 4 depicts the active stakeholders in blue and the passive 
stakeholders in red. The information relative to each stakeholder is then depicted as blue 
for information input into the system and red for information output from the system to 
that specific stakeholder. 
 
Figure 4. Operational Resource Flow Diagram 
C. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
The MSDS will define a capability enabling the U.S. Navy to autonomously 
search, detect, track, identify, and report potential underwater mines. Additionally, 
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MSDS will seek to refine existing protocols and develop/define new capabilities with 
which underwater mines can be discovered more effectively without putting warfighters 
in harm’s way. The Concept of Operations for MSDS is depicted graphically in Figure 5 
OV-1.  
 
Figure 5. Operational View OV-1 
The MSDS is shown as an autonomous vehicle searching for underwater mines 
and UWIEDs while actively in communication with external information sources shown 
as the USN Fleet. Mine threats are detected, tracked, identified and reported within 
MSDS protocol. MSDS will be a closed or bounded system that operates in an open and 
unbounded environment. The interfaces of the MSDS within the greater environment are 
restricted to be the threats (to include water hazards and underwater mines) and the 
information or data that describes them. 
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D. PROJECTED OPERATING ENVIRONMENT AND THREAT 
DEFINITION 
1. Operating Environment 
The MSDS is envisioned to be utilized in all navigable waters characterized by: 
 depths from ten (10) meters to the open ocean (excess of 100 m)  
 water temperatures as low as the sub-freezing arctic to equatorial values as 
high as 122 degrees Fahrenheit ( approximately 50°C).  
 water salinity ranging from fresh to brackish to open ocean salinity 
 water clarity ranging from zero to unlimited visibility resulting from  
particulate suspension such as bottom sedimentation churning or biological 
content (plankton bloom or red tide) 
The MSDS is additionally expected to operate successfully amidst levels of 
hostility from peaceful surveillance to open active aggression. While the MSDS will not 
possess any defensive capabilities, it will need to embody sufficient levels of 
survivability to insure successful mission performance. 
2. Threat Definition 
There are many types of mines and UWIEDs that can be characterized by the 
manner in which they are deployed, and by the mechanisms that they use to detect the 
target vessel and detonate. Deployment types are drifting, moored (at a fixed depth below 
the surface by an anchor cable from the ocean floor), bottom (resting on the sea floor), 
and buried (in the sea floor) as seen in Figure 6. Sensing and activation mechanisms 
(fuses) are classified as contacting and influence or proximity. Contacting fuses require 
physical contact between the fuse and the target vessel; these are the oldest types of 
mines that are still in use. Contact can be as simple as the depression of a mechanical 
switch or the change of electrical resistance of an electrically conducting cable. Influence 
fuses are designed to operate by detecting the presence of the target such as an increased 
magnetic field, the pressure wave caused by a ship passing above, or sound transmitted 
by a ships machinery or propeller cavitation. Influence fuses enable a mine to detonate 
near a target and essentially increase the effectiveness of the mine.  
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Figure 6. Mine Types after (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2001) 
While many countries develop and manufacture sea mines, the majority of mines 
available for use by Iran, other rogue nations, or regional/international terrorist entities 
are largely based on designs originated by China and Russia. Russian influence mines 
have been characterized as having effective sensing ranges of up to 50 to 60m (Proshkin, 
2001). Because a sea mine can only detonate if the fuse is activated the sensing range of 
the mine is considered to be the driving parameter of a mines’ effectiveness. That is, even 
though the extent of damage caused by a mine depends primarily on the size of the 
explosive charge contained in the mines’ casing, the most massive explosive charge 
within a sea mine is only as effective as the fuse mechanism that detonates it.  
Due to their closeness to land masses, minimum and maximum depth of littoral 
waters are fairly uniform values but the bottom terrain can be considerably unique as 
demonstrated by the differences between dredged river bottoms and coral reefs. The 
environmental conditions that can be experienced in littoral waters represent an 
extremely wide range of temperature and water composition in terms of salinity and 
dissolved matter. The ranges in temperature largely correspond to the disparity between 
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polar and equatorial regions. Water composition differences can result from the 
influences of river in and outflows, tidal shifts, and bottom composition (gravel or silt) or 
seasonal influences such as red tide or plankton bloom. The sea mines employed, while 
fairly limited with regard to the types of deployment and the means by which they 
detonate, can be deployed specifically to exploit the specific nuances and unique 
combinations of environmental and water composition present to the area for which 
control is desired. Because this adaptability represents itself to the user of sea mines, 
every mine field can represent its own set of challenges to a mine-countermeasures effort. 
As a means to scope the nearly endless set on mine threats within the ocean environment, 
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III. DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION (DRM) AND MODELING 
A. DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION (DRM) 
A design reference mission is presented as a means to explore the effective need 
statement from the perspective of a hypothetical event for which mine detection would 
play a significant role. The Strait of Hormuz has been chosen from the four regions 
presented earlier in the introduction. The economic significance of the Strait of Hormuz 
to the U.S. and  the rest of the world as demonstrated by its continued use as a setting for 
recent international conflict identify it as a setting for which an abundance of information 
exists. The DRM presented is, hopefully, as a fictitious problem set within a real physical 
location from which practical and actionable information can be gained. 
1. Location: Strait of Hormuz 
Crisis: In response to the enforcement of United Nations (UN) resolved economic 
sanctions by the United States and its allies, the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) has 
threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz to all shipping traffic and has claimed to have 
mined the shipping lanes defined by International Maritime Navigation Laws. Iran is 
targeting the oil tanker traffic through the strait as a means to retaliate in kind by 
depriving the rest of the world of up to 17 million barrels of crude oil per day or 35% of 
all of the world’s seaborne traded oil (U.S Energy Information Admin., 2012). 
Design Reference Mission: Search, detect, locate (depth and coordinates), identify 
(classify by deployment), and report all mines within as short of a time as possible.  Data 
from the search will be utilized by others to clear the mines and open the sea lanes for oil 
tanker traffic. 
Assigning a specific time target for the period which oil traffic must be restored is 
an extremely complex task that is dynamically driven by global demand supply chain 
considerations. As a buffer against oil supply instability and in response to past OPEC 
embargoes of the west, the U.S. maintains the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) which 
has a maximum capacity of 727 million barrels of crude oil (U.S. Department of Energy, 
2012). Average U.S. consumption of Oil for the 2011 calendar year was approximately 
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20 million barrels per day of which approximately 14 million barrels were imported. The 
impact of oil traffic stoppage through the SOH could be partially mitigated through the 
use of regional pipe lines connecting to other sea routes for which transit times are longer 
to the CONUS and Asian markets (U.S Energy Information Admin., 2012). As such, the 
time window for which the strait could remain closed has not been specified with a 
minimum or maximum value. 
2. Background 
The tanker traffic through the strait is non-stop day and night via an average of 14 
very large crude carriers (VLCC) in each direction. VLCC’s are the world’s second 
largest maritime cargo vessels second only to ultra large crude carriers (ULCC). The 
dimensions and basic information pertaining to all crude carriers are tabulated in Figure 7 
by classification. The VLCC characteristics will be used as the definition of an oil tanker 
due to their commonality. Although ULCC’s are the largest class of crude carrier, only 
two of the 12 ULCC’s currently registered are operated as ocean tankers; the remainder 
are used as offshore waterborne storage containers. Additionally, U.S. Naval vessels 
operating in the Strait of Hormuz, while critical to the effort to open (and keep open) the 
sea lanes, do not possess sufficient draft or length as compared with global crude carriers. 
The target represented by the U.S.S. Nimitz, with the exception of its’ beam, is relatively 










Class Length Beam Draft Overview 
Coastal 
Tanker 
205 m 29 m 16 m Less than 50,000 dwt, mainly used for 
transportation of refined products (gasoline, 
gasoil). 
Aframax 245 m 34 m 20 m Approximately 80,000 dwt (Average Freight Rate Assessment). 
Suezmax 
285 m 45 m 23 m Between 125,000 and 180,000 dwt, 
originally the maximum capacity of the Suez 
Canal. 
VLCC 
330 m 55 m 28 m Very Large Crude Carrier. Up to around 
320,000 dwt. Can be accommodated by the 
expanded dimensions of the Suez Canal. The 
most common length is in the range of 300 to 
330 meters. 
ULCC 
415 m 63 m 35 m Ultra Large Crude Carrier. Capacity 
exceeding 320,000 dwt. The largest tankers 
ever built have a deadweight of over 550,000 
dwt.  
 
Figure 7. Tanker Class Comparison and USS Nimitz Data 
Iran has demonstrated a willingness to use sea mines and is considered to possess 
a significant arsenal of Russian, Chinese, and North Korean made sea mines as well as 
their own produced copies.  It has fostered trading partnerships with Russia, China, and 
North Korea since its inception in 1979 following the Islamic Revolution and deposition 
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of the Shah. In addition to a full array of sea mines, Iran has purchased and developed its 
own fleet of diesel electric submarines capable of operating within the Persian Gulf, the 
Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman. It has the capability to lay mines nearly at will. 
Further, Iran has demonstrated a basic proficiency using sea mines as can be evidenced 
by U.S. losses in the 1987 Tanker War as well the denial of access of  the Kuwaiti and 
Iranian ports during the first Gulf War. 
The depth of the water in the sea lanes of the Strait of Hormuz is shown in  
Figure 8 the low tide sounding chart; depth is in meters. The tidal swings from 
low tide in the strait (close to the equator) are less than 1 m and therefore considered 
negligible. The sounding chart shows the inbound sea lane, with a weighted average 
depth of approximately 73m, is shallower than the outbound lane for which the weighted 
average depth is approximately 83m. Additionally, the range of bottom depth is 
considerably more variable for the inbound lane (66m to 84m excluding an outside corner 
depth of 62m) than it is for the outbound lane (80m to 88m). The depth variation of the 
inbound lane shows contours or gradients that represent the equivalent of hills and 
valleys in which mines could be partially hidden. The bottom depth of the outbound lane 
is far more uniform. Lastly, the inbound sea lane directly borders Iranian waters for 
approximately on third of its length. 
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Figure 8. Strait of Hormuz depth chart after (OceanGrafix, 2012) 
The flow of tanker traffic through the shipping lanes is strictly controlled as shown by the 
arrows in the sounding chart in  
Figure 8. Inbound tankers (considered to be riding higher in the water due to their 
un-laden condition) operate in the shallower water. Outbound tankers, fully laden with 
approximately 1.2 million barrels of crude oil, navigate the deeper channel within Oman 
waters; these represent viable targets due to the combined results of economic loss of 
cargo and damage to the hull. The sinking of a tanker that comes to rest on the bottom in 
either sea lane will represent a navigation obstacle resulting in lane closure until the 
wreck can be cleared. Partial destruction of a sunken tanker should be strenuously  
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avoided as the addition of any debris on the floor of the sea lanes will complicate future 
mine detection efforts by creating sources for false positives and defilades for future mine 
deployment in wreckage. 
3. Mine Field Composition 
VLCCs draw 28m; this means that their 55m hull beam (width) by approximate 
300m length rides 28m below the surface of the water. The maximum functional range 
for a bottom mine equipped with an influence fuse mechanism is approximately 60 m 
resulting in a maximum effective depth of 88m. The inbound sea lane with its’ average 
depth of approximately 73m and maximum depth of 84m combined with the bottom 
contours of peaks and depressions represents an ideal environment for the deployment of 
bottom and buried mines because the bottom of the VLCC hull will pass well within the 
influence fuse range of a mine located at average depth. 
Conversely, the outbound lane’s average depth of approximately 83m combined 
with its’ total depth variation of 80m to 88m makes it a possible but less than desirable 
environment for the use of bottom or buried mines; VLCCs will have to pass directly 
over the mine because the bottom depth is at or near the extreme range for which the 
influence fuses operate. Furthermore, the relative uniformity or lack of contours of the 
bottom depth in this lane makes it an unlikely location for the use of moored mines due to 
the probable ease with which moorings and objects suspended above the ocean floor 
could be detected. This sea lane is a likely application for the use of drifting mines 
because fully laden tankers are virtually incapable of emergency maneuvering to avoid 
detected mines near the surface that are essentially moving with the water’s current. The 
influence fuse effective range combined with VLCC draft is shown graphically Figure 9 




Figure 9. SOH Outbound Depth Comparison 
Both sea lanes of the Strait as well as the center median are likely areas for the 
use of drifting mines. The utilization of drifting mines can be enhanced by the 
bidirectional nature of the current flow through the Strait between the Gulf of Oman and 
the Persian Gulf. Drifting mines that are placed into the outflowing tide on the Persian 
Gulf side of the Straight will flow out through the Straight toward the Gulf of Oman, and, 
can possibly reenter the Strait with the incoming tidal flow if undetected. If these mines 
are fitted with sea anchors, they may be capable of remaining in the Strait through tidal 
swings moving constantly between the inbound and outbound lanes through the un-
trafficked median. Due to their unrestricted motion, drifting mines represent the largest 
single concern or threat to all outbound traffic. 
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4. Search Philosophy 
Due to the probable deployment of mines based upon direction of traffic, bottom 
depth, and profile of the bottom, the Strait should be divided into three layers or search 
depth ranges: top (surface down to 30m), middle (30m down to 60m), and bottom (60m 
down to 90m or ocean floor if shallower). 
The order in which the depth layers are searched follows a rational that emulates 
the analogy of “testing the waters before diving in”. As the oil tankers are on the surface, 
the water (and thusly mines) closest to them is searched first. The further the search 
extends beyond the water through which the tankers navigate; the threat posed by mines 
should logically change. Direct navigation threats operating within the draft depth of the 
tankers require more looking outward than down. The middle represents an area in which 
threats are essentially all around. Lastly, the bottom layer search will primarily be defined 
by looking down at the bottom and objects very near it. This layered approach could 
enable the potential of sequentially opening of the Strait sea lanes to smaller class tankers 
(Coastal, Aframax, and Suezmax) at first and then expanding the size of the traffic 
allowed as the extent of the search and confidence of success increases. 
First, both sea lanes and the median separating them need to be searched through 
the entire top layer. This is due to the concern for the use of drifting mines. Because 
targets will approach these mines essentially on a planar intercept path, the need is to 
maneuver a sensing device through this water by primarily looking (sensing) outward 
over the 30m depth from the surface rather than down. These devices can be 
conceptualized as explosive collision obstacles as they essentially occupy the same space 
through which the tankers navigate. The median area between the sea lanes must be 
searched as it could harbor a drifting mine that could enter either lane. 
Next, the middle range of 30m down to 60m will be primarily populated by 
moored mines. As these are essentially fixed position mines, the need to search the 




fast as possible. However, the immediate proximity of the median could be an ideal 
location for mines with influence fuses capable of “looking into” the inner parts of the 
inbound and outbound sea lanes. 
Lastly, the bottom layer should be searched discriminately as follows. The 
inbound and outbound lanes should be searched for moored mines in a manner similar to 
the approach used for the middle region. Once both sea lanes are deemed to have been 
searched for moored mines suspended above the bottom, the bottom surface of the 
inbound lane must be thoroughly searched to identify bottom or buried mines by focusing 
on the shallowest depths and depth transitions first and the deeper and flatter areas as 
secondary. After the inbound lane is searched, the outbound lane bottom should be 
searched focusing on the shallower sections first and the deepest portions last. 
The above sequence is based on the presumption that one search platform is 
utilized for each identified depth range. If multiple platforms were utilized or if depth 
ranges could be searched simultaneously, the sequence could be followed more 
expeditiously or multiple depth layers could be searched simultaneously or in parallel. 
Current mine detection capabilities could utilize two separate technology based 
systems to search the full depth profile that exists within the sea lanes of the Strait of 
Hormuz; Light Imaging Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) is used for surface and near 
surface search of water depths of zero at the surface down to approximately 10 meters 
and mine hunting sonar systems are used for the remaining depths down to and including 
the ocean floor. Both systems are deployed and operate from airborne platforms. 
Conceivably, these two technologies would be applied sequentially and in a 
complimentary manner: LIDAR to detect and enable the clearing of any surface and near 
surface threats so that towed mine hunting sonar “fish” could operate freely in a look out 
and down manner with the confidence that the possibility of snagging or fowling its tow 
cable in contact with near surface mine tethers (both mine to mine and moored to the sea 
floor) has been removed. Because of the ease with which drifting mines could be placed 
into the Strait’s currents from small submarines and disguised surface vessels during the 
towed sonar operation, continued use of LIDAR surveillance would be advised during the 
deeper water search efforts. 
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B. DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION (DRM) MODELING 
Having presented and developed the DRM as a context for the utilization of a 
Mine Safety Detection System to search of the Strait of Hormuz for sea mines, the 
modeling of the search effort follows. Many technologies and solutions have been 
explored and developed to search for and detect the presence of sea mines. The modeling 
presented attempts to simulate the search of the Strait of Hormuz using active sonar as 
the detection technology. A brief discussion of the rationale employed to select active 
sonar follows. 
The ships targeted by mines in these waters have been assumed to be commercial 
vessels. As such, the deployment methods for the use of sea mines have been assumed to 
be drifting, moored, and bottom; self-propelled or actively maneuvering mines such as 
dormant active torpedoes have not been considered. Buried mines represent special cases 
of bottom deployments for which a portion of the mine is exposed to the sea; they have 
been treated equivalently to bottom mines resting on the sea floor. These mines have 
further been assumed to be of the same basic size, shape and materials; anechoic or sound 
absorbing coatings are not considered. 
Search/detection and Assessment/identification will have to be performed within 
the full volume of water from the surface to the bottom or sea floor. These efforts must be 
performed in all conditions of available light (both day/night and depth), particulate 
suspension (biological and sedimentation), and water temperature extremes of heat and 
cold to name a few. Additionally, the means by which the functions are performed must 
be reliable and capable of producing predictable and repeatable results to the extent that 
modeling and simulation of them could be performed. While many promising theoretical 
and experimental approaches are being developed, mature processes should be chosen 
whenever a choice exists.  
With the basic assumption that all of the sea mines have the same essential 
properties regardless of the depth and means by which they are deployed and with a 
minimal set of criterion by which to evaluate potential solutions, several specific 
technologies were evaluated with respect to their individual applicability to conduct the 
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Search/Detect and Identify/Assess functions for/of sea mines. The technologies 
considered were radar, active sonar, passive sonar, infra-red (IR) thermal imaging, 
LIDAR (Light Detection and Ranging), and the use of marine mammals (dolphins and 
porpoises). 
Radar (Radio Detection and Ranging) utilizes high frequency radio waves emitted 
from a source to bounce off of an object and return to the source from which the distance 
between the source and the object can be inferred from the time of travel in essentially 
the same manner that active sonar utilizes sound. Most radar systems utilize microwave 
transmissions which are readily absorbed by seawater rendering it useful over only very 
short ranges of feet as opposed to hundreds of meters prevalent in littoral waterways. 
Although efforts are on-going to solve this and other issues, the use of underwater radar 
systems is considered to be too experimental. 
Sonar (Sound Navigation and Ranging) operates similarly to radar except that 
sound waves take the place of radio or microwaves. Sonar can be divided into two classes 
of passive and active. 
Passive sonar consists of listening for or receiving sound energy waves that 
originate from other sources; because the sea mines of this evaluation are essentially 
inactive (as a source of sound energy) until they detonate, they will not produce any 
measurable sound source from which they can be detected. Additionally, because passive 
sonar requires listening, it is extremely susceptible to ambient noise interference from 
both active (intentional) and unintentional sources. As such, passive sonar has not been 
pursued as a viable technology solution. 
Active sonar consists of transmitting sound source energy and receiving the return 
or reflection from objects in the water. Active sonar has seen extensive use in military, 
commercial, and scientific research environments as a means to both search large 
volumes of water and to identify objects both suspended in the water and resting on the 
ocean floor. The metallic materials used for basic sea mines make them very good 
reflectors of sound energy when compared to surrounding underwater naturally occurring 
substances. Additionally, the aforementioned extensive use of sonar makes it a reliable 
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and predictable technology from which to simulate and study its performance as part of a 
larger effort. A limitation of active sonar is its ineffectiveness at and near the water’s 
surface; the boundary created by the water to air interface creates reflections that render a 
sonar system blind when looking up in close proximity to the waters’ surface. 
Infrared or thermal imaging technology works in much the same way that passive 
sonar does. In the case of IR, the heat that is radiated from an object is captured by a lens 
of a receiving device in the same way that a camera takes a photo. If IR could be used to 
provide visual data relating to mines, this information would support its use in the 
fulfillment of the Assess/identify functions. The problem or challenge to IR is that the 
ocean acts, generally, as a vast heat sink causing things that do not continually generate 
or dissipate heat energy to achieve thermal equilibrium (i.e., the same temperature as) 
with the water around them. As such, inanimate objects become essentially invisible 
within a short amount of time of submerged in the ocean. The metallic materials of mines 
conduct heat quite well; the time to achieve thermal equilibrium is relatively short. 
Lastly, IR methods generally tend to be associated with fairly high false alarm rates. 
LIDAR (Light Imaging Detection and Ranging) represents a newly developing 
technology to find mines at or near the surface. A light source of blue-green laser energy 
is projected at the water surface from the air above; objects that are at the surface or 
suspended below the surface (near surface) are illuminated and reflect some of the laser 
light back to cameras near the source. The images captured are digitally stored and 
compared to reference data using analysis software and operator expertise. LIDAR, 
though relatively new and still developmental, provides a needed means to fill the surface 
and near surface water ineffectiveness of active sonar. The ability of LIDAR to capture 
images makes it well suited for the Assessment/identification functions for which 
inferences are made regarding the fusing mechanisms of a sea mine. 
Sea mammal use for detecting mines has been shown to be very effective. The 
detection and location of bottom mines is a particular deployment method for which they 
have been extremely effective. Sea mammals (dolphin and porpoises) however, represent 
highly complex and extremely disparate individual solutions; i.e., mammals, as 
independent autonomous organisms, are difficult to replicate using a single model. 
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Further, the level of extent to which data can be transferred to and from sea mammals 
make them unique unlikely candidate choices to support the direction of the CONOPS 
away from dedicated or exotic resources. Lastly, the political notions with regard to the 
perceived endangerment or exploitation of animals are potentially toxic in todays’ 
landscape. As such, the utilization of marine mammals has not been pursued. 
Both active sonar and LIDAR together are needed to effectively search the waters 
of the sea lanes of the Strait of Hormuz and detect the presence of the mines deployed on 
the manner presented in the DRM discussion. Of these two, active sonar was chosen as 
the more suitable technology to model the search and detection functions. The limitations 
of active sonar’s effectiveness on and near the surface are acknowledged; for these 
depths, the results obtained using active sonar are intended to be representative of those 
achieved using the developmental, newer technology of LIDAR. Additionally, the 
determination of a mine’s type and operating mechanism (fuse) was modeled as a result 
of the observed location of the mine and the behavior of the mine in the water (i.e., water 
depth from surface and motion) rather than assessed from individual mine information as 
compared to a database. This simplification is a modeling convenience and is not 
intended to diminish the roles that identification and threat assessment perform for the 
broader effort. Lastly, all mines have been assumed to be fitted with influence rather than 
contact fusing mechanisms; this is a conservative treatment as the effective range of 
influence fuses exceeds contact mechanisms. 
1. Building the Model 
a. Data Sources 
The source material for the model is based on the results from “Evaluation 
of the Performance of a Minehunting Sonar” (Thompson, 1997).  It details mine detection 
performance or probability of detection (Pd) as a function of range from the sonar 
platform to the mine as shown in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10. Typical Mine hunting sonar performance from (Thompson, 1997)  
..it is apparent that the detection performance of a minehunting sonar 
fluctuates from ping-to-ping. Variations are also observed over longer 
periods and these variations occur even when the environment appears to 
be constant. Because the sonar performance fluctuates, the measurement 
of performance must be treated as a statistical sampling process. It is not 
sufficient to carry out a single detection run against a target and to use the 
detection range as a reliable indicator of sonar detection 
performance…The measure of detection performance used is that of 
probability of detection as a function of range. This is defined as the 
probability of detection by the time that the minehunter has closed the 
range from infinity to the given range. (Thompson, 1997) 
Figure 10 shows the Pd at various ranges with twenty runs which produces the 
90% confidence limit.  Range is defined as the distance between the sensor and the mine. 
b. Assumptions 
The Pd for the DRM model is based on a table lookup for the values in 
Figure 10 which solely depend on: 
 Sensor to mine range 
 Number of passes of sensor over the minefield 
 Goal: Overall Mine Detection Rate (MDR) = 95% 
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 Minimum desired confidence interval is 90%. 
Factors or variables not included in the DRM model are:  
 Bottom reverberation 
 Noise level 
 Propagation loss 
 Target strength 
 Operator 
 Sonar surface conditions 
Operational factors that were ignored for model simplicity: 
 Transit time between SOH shipping lanes 
 Gap between and around SOH shipping lanes 
 Longevity or refueling of search vehicles 
c. Mine Field Generation 
The DRM model “minefield is populated … in a manner that gives a 
uniformly random distribution in both length and width” (Driels, 2004).  The mine field 
dimensions and composition are found in Table 3. The depth of the entire minefield is 
based on the outbound shipping lane of the SOH which is deeper and the “worst case 
scenario”.  The width of the minefield is based on the shared width of the each of the 
SOH shipping lanes.  The minefield length is based on the combined inbound and 
outbound shipping route lengths of the SOH.   
Length (m) (in+out) 61,250 
Width (m) 3,200 
Depth (m) 88 
# of Mines 500 
Table 3. Minefield Composition 
The probability of the type of mine deployed in the SOH is shown in 




  Symbol P(Deployed) Type of Mine 
Drifting D 0.2 
Moored M 0.5 
Bottom B 0.3 
Table 4. Mine type uniform probability of deployment 
Once the type of mine is chosen the depth is chosen.  The bottom mines 
will obviously be on the sea floor (88m).  The drifting and moored mines are uniformly 







Table 5. Drifting and moored mine depth boundaries 
2. DRM Modeling Results 
The width of each individual shipping lane of the SOH is much wider or off the 
chart for sonar range in Figure 10.  Half the SOH shipping lane is 1,600m, but the 
maximum sonar detection range in Figure 10 is just over 500m with a Pd of less than 
10%. 
Figure 11 shows the poor search results that would result from using a single 
search vehicular with an overall detection rate of 24%. (Table 6).  It also shows the 
randomly uniform distribution of the mines with the minefield as well as the path of the 
sensor.  As expected the undetected mines are located on the outer edge of the minefield.  
Pd is based on the range between the mine and the sensor.  A table look up is performed 
for the range based on binomial distribution from Figure 10.  Since most of the ranges do 
not have an exact match from Figure 10 a linear approximation is made for Pd from the 
two closest range points.  
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Figure 11. Single Minefield length & width location (Green Circles Detected/Red 
X’s Undetected) 
General types of mines based on deployment method: 
 Drifting – floating mines at/near the surface of the water 
 Moored – mines that are anchored/weighted to the sea floor at various 
levels 











Drifting  D  0.2  5.2  107  27  25% 
Moored  M  0.5  39.7  252  62  25% 
Bottom  B  0.3  88.0  141  31  22% 
Totals  na  1  na  500  120  24% 
Table 6. Single Sensor Mine detection Summary 
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To increase the MDR additional sensors or MCM vehicles were added to the 
model.  A minimum of five sensors platforms were required to simultaneously sweep the 
SOH to achieve the 95% MDR goal. 
Figure 12 is a “top down” view of the combined shipping lanes.  It shows the 
sensor platforms evenly spaced across the width of the SOH.  The majority of the 
undetected mines (red X’s) are on the outside of the shipping lanes.  This is the result of 
the edges not have the mutual sensor coverage enjoyed by the areas between two sensors.  
The location of the sensors as they pass through the shipping lanes is listed in Table 7.  
 
Figure 12. Five Sensor Minefield Distribution Across the Width of the SOH (Green 
Circles Detected/Red X’s Undetected) 











 Depth of Sensor (m) Loc_W (m) 
Sensor 1 0 533 
Sensor 2 0 1067 
Sensor 3 0 1600 
Sensor 4 0 2133 
Sensor 5 0 2667 
Table 7. Sensor Location in Shipping Lane (Depth & Width) 
Figure 13 is a cross section of the shipping lanes or a “side view”.  No noticeable 
pattern is seen based solely on mine depth. 
 
 
Figure 13. Five Sensor Minefield length & Depth Location (Green Circles 
Detected/Red X’s Undetected) 
Figure 14 shows the distance between the mine and the closes sensor vs. the depth 




300m of any given sensor.  As expected the undetected mines are most highly 
concentrated at the greatest distances with bottom mines tending to be the farthest away 
from the sensors.   
 
 
Figure 14. Five Sensor Mine/Sensor Distance vs. Depth Location (Green Circles 
Detected/Red X’s Undetected) 












Drifting D 0.2 5.2 87 85 98% 
Moored M 0.5 41.9 255 243 95% 
Bottom B 0.3 88.0 158 148 94% 
Totals na 1 na 500 476 95% 
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Table 8 shows the improved results using 5 vehicles to scan the SOH.   The 
variation of detection rates between drifting, moored and bottom mines can be explained 
by their increasing distance from the surface riding MCM detection vehicles and sensors. 
Overall a MDR of 95% with a 90% confidence interval was achieved using 5 vehicles 
each doing 20 passes. 
3. DRM Time to Search 
A high MDR is not the only constraint.  MCM operations in the SOH need to be 
performed in a timely fashion to open the straight to commercial oil traffic and US Naval 
ships.   
Equation 1 shows the basic calculation for each individual vehicular to travel 
through both shipping lanes.  Note that the transit time between the inbound and 
outbound lanes is ignored as well as any refueling requirements. 
nsNumberOfRu
Velocity
LengthSearchTime *  
 
Equation 1: Search Time 
 
For an autonomous underwater vehicular (AUV) with an average maximum 
sustained speed of  2 knots or 1.028m/s the search time for the SOH with a single 
vehicular is 330 hours or 13.7 days.  This same search time applies to five search vehicles 
model example since the vehicles would be searching in parallel.  The search time could 
be halved by doubling the number of search vehicles.  This would allow you to search 
both shipping lanes at the same time and avoid lane-to-lane transit times. 













 Knots M/S Km # Hours Days Hours Days
UAV 2 1.03 61.25 20 330.7 13.8 165.4 6.9 
Towed 10 5.14 61.25 20 66.1 2.8 33.1 1.4 
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Figure 15.  Sweep Time vs. Vehicular Speed 
For a sensor platform being towed by an aerial vehicular with an average 
maximum sustained speed of 10 knots or 5.14m/s the search time for the SOH with a 
single vehicular is 66.1 hours or 2.76 days.  A summary of the SOH search times can be 
found in Table 9 and the overall effect of the vehicular speed on the total sweep time for 
the SOH can be found in Figure 15. 
The DRM has been used to evaluate the use of active sonar to search for mines 
deployed to disrupt commercial vessel traffic in specific environmental conditions. The 
insights gained will now be applied to develop the requirements the MSDS must satisfy. 
The requirements will then be transformed into functions needed to satisfy them. 
Assessment of the current Navy MCM CONOPS will be determined by comparing its 
component solution functions to the set derived from the DRM. 
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IV. REQUIREMENTS, FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS AND 
ARCHITECTURE 
A. REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY  
The requirements for the MSDS have been identified at the system level and are 
identified in Table 10. The requirements for the MSDS were derived from mine hunting 
capability research, DRM modeling and evaluation of stakeholder requirements. Many 
different types of requirements have been identified, to include functional requirements, 







These are the requirements for the system 
architecture.  The higher level requirements trace 
back to the capabilities. Requirements are 
decomposed from high level solution-neutral 
capabilities and requirements all the way down to 
solution-oriented system specifications. 
REQ.1 Search/Detect The system shall be able to search and detect 
different types of underwater mines, drifting, moored, 
bottom/buried.  
REQ.1.1 Search Sensing The system shall have a search area of xx cubic 
meters 
REQ.1.1.1 Searching Speed The system shall be capable of performing a search 
moving at speeds greater than or equal to yy m/sec. 
REQ.1.2 Detect The system shall detect different types of underwater 
mines, drifting, moored, bottom/buried. 
REQ.1.2.1 Mine Location The system shall be capable of locating a mine within 
a volume of 8 cubic meters 
REQ.1.2.2 Mine Depth The System shall determine a mine's depth in water 





REQ.1.2.3 Mine Coordinates The system shall fix the position of fixed position 
mines (i.e., bottom and moored) within 6 cubic 
meters. 
REQ.1.2.4 Mine Velocity The system shall be able to determine the velocity of 
a moving mine (drifting) within .1 m/sec 
REQ.1.2.5 Mine Path The system shall be able to predict the position of a 
moving mine (drifting) within 10 sq. meters for a 
period of 30 minutes after detection. 
REQ.2 Assess/Identify The system shall assess the information to determine 
if threat is a mine and what type of mine. 
REQ.2.1 Assess The system shall assess the threat information to 
determine if threat is a mine. 
REQ.2.1.1 Threat signature 
data comparison 
The system shall compare gathered threat data to an 
existing data and determine whether or not a threat is 
a mine within xx seconds and with a 90% level of 
confidence 
REQ.2.2 Identify The system shall identify different types of 
underwater mines, drifting, moored, bottom/buried 
along with the fuse type of the mine. 
REQ.2.2.1 Mine 
Classification 
The system shall correctly differentiate between the 
types of mines (drifting, moored, and bottom/buried) 
with a 90% level of confidence 
REQ.2.2.2 Mine Fuse 
Identification 
The system shall correctly differentiate between 
contact and influence sensing fuses with a 90% level 
of confidence 
REQ.3 Report The system shall transmit all waterborne contacts 
with a threat assessment as well as system status in a 
real time format 
REQ.3.1 Mine Threat 
Identification 
Report 
The system shall transmit all identified mine data 





REQ.3.2 Non-Mine Threat 
Identification 
Report 
The system shall transmit all identified non-mine data 
within 60 seconds of collection 
REQ.3.3 Operational Status The system will transmit operational status such as 
sonar sensor operational status, battery power level, 
and data storage level, every 10 minutes, or when 
queried by an operator 
REQ.3.4 Mine Location 
Report 
The system shall report mine location in the 
Geographic Coordinate System  (i.e. lat-long-depth) 
REQ.4 Suitability  The system shall be operationally suitable. 
REQ.4.1 Operational 
Availability 
The system shall have an operational availability of 
0.9. 
REQ.4.2 Maintainability The system shall require no more than 10 days 
maintenance per fiscal year 
REQ.4.2.1 Built in Test 
(BIT) 
The system shall incorporate a Built-in-Test (BIT).   
REQ.4.2.1.1 BIT Execution The BIT shall execute automatically on power-up, 
following reset, and when initiated by an operator.  
REQ.4.2.1.2 BIT Operation The BIT shall be performed continuously to monitor 
MSDS unit operation including 
network/communications integrity.   
REQ.4.2.1.3 BIT Errors Any errors detected during start-up and BIT shall be 
alarmed and displayed for the operator 
REQ.4.3 Reliability The system shall have a Mean Time Between Failure 
(MTBF) of XX hours. 
REQ.5 Physical 
Requirements 
The system shall be fully compatible with the MH-
60R/S CSTRS (Carriage, Stream, Tow, and Recover 
System) 








  The system shall be capable of operating in ocean 
environments worldwide. 
REQ.5.2.1 Temperature The system shall be capable of meeting operation 
performance requirements in water temperatures 
between 0 deg C (32 deg F) and 49 deg C (120 deg F 
approx). 
REQ.5.2.2 Water Salinity The system shall be capable of operating in salt 
concentrations between zero and 70 grams per liter 
REQ.5.2.3 Water Current The system shall be capable of operating in water 
currents of up to 1 m/sec (approximately a 2 knot 
current) 
REQ.5.2.4 Water Alkalinity The system shall be capable of operating in water 
with pH levels between 6.8 and .78 




The system shall be interoperable with existing Naval 
Command, Control, Computers and Communication 




The system shall be capable of knowing its location 
within the Geographic Coordinate System  (i.e. lat-
long-depth) within 10 cubic meters 
REQ.7.1 Awareness of 
other Vessels 
The system shall be capable of knowing the 
Geographic Coordinate System (i.e. lat-long-depth) 
location of other fleet assets and non-fleet vessels 
within 1 mile. 
REQ.8 Cooperative 
Search 
The system shall be capable of adaptive and 
cooperative search with other organic and dedicated 
mine searching vessels and systems. 
Table 10. MSDS Requirements Summary 
 45
B. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS  
This section describes the MSDS functional breakdown, decomposition, and 
logical interactions and relationships of all system functions.  The overall function is to 
conduct mine detection.  In order to meet this task, the MSDS overall function is 
decomposed down to three main (top-level) functional elements: 
 
 Search/Detect Threat 
 Assess/Identify Threat  
 Report Threat Information 
 
The aforementioned three main functions are further subdivided into sub 









Figure 17. Hierarchy of Functions – Level 2 and EMs - Function 1.0 
 
 














Figure 19. Hierarchy of Functions – Level 2 and EMs Function 3.0 
Each of the above functions and sub functions are mapped directly/indirectly to a 













F.1 Search/Detect REQ.1 Search/Detect  
F.1.1 Search Mission Area for Threat REQ.1.1 Search Sensing REQ.1.1.1 Searching Speed  
F.1.2 Detect Threat 
REQ.1.2 Detect  
REQ.1.2.1 Mine Location  
REQ.1.2.2 Mine Depth  
REQ.1.2.3 Mine Coordinates  
REQ.1.2.4 Mine Velocity  
REQ.1.2.5 Mine Path  
F.2 Assess/Identify REQ.2 Assess/Identify  
F.2.1 Assess Threat Type REQ.2.1 Assess  
F.2.1.1 Verify Threat is a Mine REQ.2.1.1 Threat signature data comparison  
F.2.1.2 Compare with Existing Mine Data REQ.2.1.1 Threat signature data comparison  
F.2.2 Identify Type of Mine REQ.2.2 Identify  
F.2.2.1 Scan Mine Signature REQ.2.2.1 Mine Classification  REQ.2.2.2 Mine Fuse Identification  
F.2.2.2 Scan Mine Physical Attributes REQ.2.2.1 Mine Classification  REQ.2.2.2 Mine Fuse Identification  
F.3 Report REQ.3 Report  REQ.3.3 Operational Status  
F.3.1 Generate Threat Assessment 
REQ.3.1 Mine Threat Identification 
Report  
REQ.3.4 Mine Location Report  
F.3.2 Generate Non Threat Assessment REQ.3.2 Non-Mine Threat Identification Report  
Table 11. MSDS Functional Requirements Tracing 
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The System Engineering process has now been executed up to the System 
Architecting step of the left side of the VEE as shown earlier in Figure 3.  Next, 
components of the U.S. Navy’s CONOPS will be compared to these decomposed 
functions by allocating them to fielded systems. This comparison will provide a fresh 
look at the CONOPS as a means to identify strengths, weaknesses, and improvement 
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V. OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS 
The U.S. Navy will ultimately lead the effort to search the Strait of Hormuz for 
the presence of sea mines if and when that effort is needed. The CONOPS and the 
systems that support it will enable the Navy in this endeavor. In the operational analysis 
to follow, the capabilities of the Navy’s current MCM CONOPS components are 
compared to the DRM established functional needs. By performing the comparison by 
allocation, specific inferences are made to identify aspects of the CONOPS for which 
improvement is needed. Lastly, the authors present their recommendations for possible 
ways in which the CONOPS could be strengthened for improvement as it is envisioned to 
be utilized within the context of the DRM. 
A. MODULAR MCM CONOPS REQUIREMENTS OR CAPABILITIES 
The mine detection portion of the U.S. Navy’s organic in stride mine 
countermeasures CONOPS has been narrowed to the use of active sonar and electro-
optical sensors in the form of streak tube imaging laser (STIL) and LIDAR. These 
technologies are employed by two systems that are both intended to be deployed in the 
future from the MH-60S helicopter. Active sonar and STIL will be provided by the 
AN/AQS-20A mine hunting system. LIDAR technology is relatively new and is provided 
by the Airborne Laser-Mine Detection System (AES-1 ALMDS). By using two systems, 
the water volume from the surface (or near surface) to the bottom of relatively shallow 
littoral waters can be effectively searched.  The extent to which these two systems satisfy 
the functional needs of the Mine Detection Safety System is shown by an allocation 








Search/Detect AES-1 ALMDS (LIDAR at/near surface) AN/AQS-20A(depths in excess of 10 m) 
Assess/Identify AES-1 ALMDS (LIDAR at/near surface) AN/AQS-20A(depths in excess of 10 m) 
Report 
Operator function using data gathered by 
above systems 
Generate Threat Assessment 
Operator function using data gathered by 
above systems 
Generate Non Threat Assessment Operator function using data gathered by above systems 
Table 12. Functional Allocation 
The AN/AQS-20A mine hunting sonar is intended to replace the AN/AQS-24A 
sonar system as the work horse of the Navy’s mine detection systems. Both the AN/AQS-
24A and the AN/AQS-20A have been towed beneath the surface by the CH-53/MH-53 
helicopters; The AN/AQS-20A is planned to be towed behind the newer MH-60S 
helicopters. The AN/AQS-20A utilizes five sonar sensors to “look down, out to the sides, 
and forward” for mines when towed beneath the surface or maintained at a fixed height 
above the ocean floor. Additionally, the electro-optical sensors enable the system to 
capture and transmit high resolution images of an object. The AN/AQS-20A is utilized to 
detect, locate, classify, and identify moored and bottom sea mines. Limitations of the 
AN/AQS-20A are the need to house special operating equipment as modifications to the 
MH-60S internal cabin space as well as the need for a dedicated operator on board the 
MH-60S during operation. 
The AN/AQS-20A is ineffective for finding mines at the surface and the near 
surface. The AES-1 ALMDS system is utilized to search the area by using four cameras 
mounted beneath a separate MH-60S helicopter; the STIL capture images of the ocean 
surface that are illuminated (lit up) by a wide fan of pulsed blue-green laser light. The 
laser source and STIL (cameras) are mounted in a pod beneath the MH-60S airframe. The 
AES-1 ALMDS includes digital image software that employs a “…automatic target 
recognition algorithm to pick out potential mine-like objects, and stores their images for 
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classification by shipboard fleet operators, using computer-aided post-mission analysis 
tools.” While this LIDAR system does not require a dedicated operator onboard the MH-
60S helicopter, the need for operator evaluation in a post-mission analysis shipboard 
setting represents a significant limitation of not providing real time data. The AES-1 
ALMDS system is intended to be used to detect surface and near surface floating and 
drifting mines. 
B. CURRENT CONOPS REQUIRED CAPABILITY VERSUS MODELING 
RESULTS/INFERENCES 
The mine detection modeling of the Strait of Hormuz has been performed to 
represent all mine detection efforts with active sonar. The model does not address the 
need for two separate technologies; one to identify mines near the surface, and a different 
one to detect mines that are moored beneath the surface or resting on the sea floor. All 
mine detection behavior simulates the use of active sonar techniques. LIDAR systems are 
the current preferred technology used to detect surface and near surface mines. For the 
purpose of this analysis, LIDAR has been assumed to be as capable of detecting surface 
and near surface mines as active sonar is of detecting subsurface and bottom mines. In 
spite of the limitations of the modeling approach, meaningful inferences can be drawn 
about the performance of the Navy’s CONOPS. 
 Mine detection modeling of the Strait of Hormuz produced the following results: 
 A minimum of approximately 1.4 days will be required to clear 95% of all of 
the sea mines from both sea lanes with a confidence level of 90%.  
 A total of ten (10) sensor platforms (5 per sea lane) are required to operate 
simultaneously non-stop during that 1.4 day period. 
These results represent challenges to the US Navy’s organic modular MCM 
vision. 
 A minimum of five LCS hulls would be required full time to perform the 
Airborne Mine Countermeasures mission (two Sikorsky CH-60/S helicopters 
deployed from each LCS). 
 Each CH-60/S is capable of deploying either one AN/ALQ-20A mine hunting 
sonar system from a Carriage, Stream, Tow, and Recover System (CSTRS) or 
one AES-ALMDS (Airborne Laser Mine Detection System) from a standard 
BRU-14 bomb rack but not both simultaneously. 
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 The inability of one CH-60/S platform to search for moored and bottom mines 
using the AN/AQS-20A sonar and search for surface and near surface mines 
using the AES-1 ALMDS LIDAR essentially doubles the number of 
helicopters (and consequently, LCS hulls) needed regardless of the other 
missions that the helicopters will be required to conduct. 
C. MCM CONOPS RECOMMENDATIONS 
In response to the challenges identified from the Strait of Hormuz DRM., 
recommendations to revise or enhance the Navy’s current MCM CONOPS are presented.  
 A new MCM CONOPS should be created to address the resource limitations 
identified from the DRM study. This new MCM CONOPS would represent a 
near term solution by allocating or reassigning assets from other mission 
CONOPS or from programs currently planned for retirement. The current 
CONOPS calls for 55 LCS hulls. The near term absence of available hulls 
could be filled by the utilization of Arleigh Burke class destroyers as 
dedicated AMCM platforms capable of deploying two MH-60/S helicopters 
each. Alternatively, a shortage of MH-60/S helicopters could be mitigated by 
extending the life of older CH-53 helicopters from the larger LHA and LHD 
class ships. As part of the new CONOPS, the retirement of the dedicated 
Minesweeper fleet should be revisited. 
 The development of a new MCM CONOPS must be fully analyzed far beyond 
the suggestions provided above. The time limitations of this effort have 
precluded a full analysis. As a minimum, the new MCM CONOPS must be 
developed and refined by successively repeating the evaluation performed.  
 Incorporating automated MCM search, detection, identification, and 
assessment efforts is a study in and of itself and should be undertaken 
separately. Automation is needed to satisfy the effective need statement goal 
of getting the warfighter out of the minefield during MCM operations. 
Currently, warfighters fly the helicopters and operate helicopter crew cabin 
consoles as part of use of the AN/AQS-20A mine hunting sonar; these 
warfighters are essentially in the minefield when they are flying above it. 
Additionally, warfighters are key components of the data processing aspects 
of the threat assessment/identification functions as shown from the functional 
allocation of Table 12 for both active sonar and LIDAR. In the case of LIDAR 
use, operators are needed to evaluate images captured and recorded by the 
cameras as part of the threat identification and assessment process. Because 
the LIDAR (AN/AES-1 ALMDS) solution particularly addresses the surface 
and near surface depths where drifting mines are most prevalent, information 
processing delays introduce additional uncertainty to the outcome of 
subsequent efforts (i.e., acquisition and neutralization of moving targets such 
as drifting mines). 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS/FUTURE WORK 
The project provides a “fresh look” at the current CONOPS intended to be served 
by the MCM Mission Modules under development for the LCS. Modeling techniques 
were applied to vet the current CONOPS in response to the mission of searching for and 
detecting sea mines placed in the Strait of Hormuz. The DRM developed can be used and 
expanded to enable the Navy’s MCM CONOPS effectiveness. 
A.  CONCLUSIONS 
 The Strait of Hormuz provides an ideal and relevant setting for the evaluation 
of the performance of an MCM CONOPS. The elements of ocean 
environment including bottom depth profile, target signature parameters (oil 
tankers), and the characteristics of opposing force weapons (sea mines) have 
been combined to show how an enemy could leverage the interactions of these 
elements to achieve his stated goal of disrupting the flow of oil tanker traffic. 
By performing the effort to describe the tactics that could be used by the 
enemy, the capabilities that are needed to defeat them becomes the transparent 
goal of the exercise. 
 Comparison of the search and detection functional requirements as derived 
from the Strait of Hormuz DRM to the U.S. Navy’s current MCM CONOPS 
components reveals the CONOPS to be both resource and technology limited. 
The CONOPS must be capable of detecting mines deployed at surface or near 
surface depths as well as mines deployed at deeper depths down to the ocean 
floor. The current CONOPS requires two systems (AN/AQS-20A active sonar 
and AN/AES-1 ALMDS LIDAR) to search these two depth ranges 
effectively. However, both systems are deployed from the same helicopter 
platform (MH-60/S). Because the two systems currently cannot be physically 
mounted on the air frame simultaneously, twice as many air frames are 
required to search at the two depth regions. This combined reliance upon two 
search technologies deployed from a common system reveals the effectiveness 
of the current CONOPS to be completely reliant upon the availability of MH-
60/S helicopters. Lastly, the determination of the MH-60/S as the multi-
mission helicopter of the CONOPS, the CONOPS ship platforms are not 
capable of deploying the larger AMCM helicopters (CH-53) which may be 
capable of physically mounting the two AMCM systems simultaneously. 
 MCM search, detection, identification, and threat assessment activities must 
be less reliant upon human operators as integral information processors. The 
current Navy CONOPS rely heavily upon warfighters to fly the helicopters 
over the mine field, operate operator consoles in the cabin of the helicopter (in 
the case of the AN/AQS-20A), and to act as primary data evaluators for the 
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information gathered from both systems. The goal to get the warfighters out of 
the air above the minefield results from the effective need statement. Meeting 
this goal would additionally reduce the reliance upon the MH-60S helicopters 
freeing them to be available for the other CONOPS missions for which they 
are needed. 
The above conclusions support the larger conclusion that a new CONOPS 
employing a combination of the older MCM platforms in conjunction with the new 
AMCM systems could achieve the same results with less uncertainty. 
 The current CONOPS requires 55 LCS hulls each equipped with two MH-
60/S helicopters. 
 LCS production delays could be augmented through the utilization of Arleigh 
Burke class destroyers or amphibious assault ships (i.e., LHAs or LHDs) 
assuming enough MH-60/S helicopters were available. 
 The larger CH-53 helicopters deployed from LHAs and LHDs could perform 
a portion of the AMCM mission, if the MH-60/S helicopters were not 
available in sufficient quantities. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
The Strait of Hormuz DRM has been developed as a basic tool for the evaluation 
of the Navy’s current CONOPS. Many simplifications have been employed in the 
performance simulation algorithms to the extent that it qualifies as a “back of the 
envelope” model. The modeling techniques could be evaluated to include suitability 
considerations such as operational availability due to scheduled and planned maintenance 
and AMCM system changeover times (e.g., removing the LIDAR and the bomb rack unit 
and replacing with the Carriage, Stream, Tow and Recovery System (CSTRS) and 
AN/AQS-20 sonar fish). Additionally, the assumption that the LIDAR performance in 
surface/near surface depths is represented by the sonar performance could be vetted by 
independently modeling LIDAR and incorporating if significantly different from sonar. 
The Strait of Hormuz DRM also includes a modeling convenience of assigning 
identification and assessment results to mines as a function of their deployed depth. This 
convenience could be replaced by a more truthful representation of the identification and 
assessment functions by applying a probabilistic treatment to the prediction of those 
results. 
 57
Lastly with regard to the DRM modeling the environment could be expanded to 
study mine usage and detection in deeper water. Along with this, the mine inventory 
should be expanded to include active homing mines such as rising and vectoring variants. 
With the understanding that these sophisticated mines are almost solely developed to 
engage naval surface combatants, the potential target list would correspondingly be 
increased to include surface combatants. 
Regardless of the complexity of the DRM performance model, the new MCM 
CONOPS should be developed and refined using the DRM performance as criteria. The 
relative comparison of the new verses the old CONOPS will provide meaningful insight 
into the relative strengths and weaknesses of the changes and support tradeoff study. 
The mission capability of the MH-60/S to simultaneously carry AN/AQS-20A 
and AN/AES-1 ALMDS, and ultimately, simultaneously operate the two systems in flight 
to support AMCM missions is strongly encouraged. Because the “Achilles heel” of the 
current CONOPS is its reliance of AMCM systems deployed from the single MH-60/S 
helicopter combined with the need for the helicopter in support of other missions such as 
vertical replenishment, SAR, and CSAR, the operational availability of the helicopter 
should be increased to the maximum extent possible. 
Finally, separate independent efforts are recommended to: 
 develop automated MCM capabilities that do not insert warfighters 
into the minefield during MCM efforts. 
And, 
 elevate the human role of mine identification and assessment from 












APPENDIX  A –  DRM MODEL METHODOLOGY 
A. GENERATING THE PROBABILITY OF DETECTION (PD) TABLE 
The Pd table is based on the Figure 10. This chart was recreated in Microsoft 
Excel as shown in Figure 20. 
 
 
Figure 20. Pd Look Up Table 
A lookup table was created from Figure 20 with the Pd corresponding to the mine 










Plot Point Range (m) P(det) 
0 .0001 1 
1 158 1.00 
2 215 0.96 
3 230 0.92 
4 254 0.86 
5 271 0.81 
6 298 0.76 
7 312 0.71 
8 317 0.65 
9 318 0.60 
10 328 0.55 
11 341 0.51 
12 351 0.44 
13 359 0.40 
14 379 0.35 
15 389 0.29 
16 408 0.24 
17 421 0.20 
18 431 0.15 
19 451 0.10 
20 509 0.05 
Table 13. SOH Search Time Summary 
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Since most mine to sensor ranges do not exactly fall on one of the ranges list in 
Table 13 an estimated Pd was calculated using a linear approximation. 
0* yxmy   
 


























Equation 4: Calculating Y intercept 
 
0* PdRmPd   
 
Equation 5: Final Pd equation 
 
Equation 2 through Equation 5  show the simple calculations for performing 
linear approximations for Pd between two ranges in Table 13. 
B. GENERATE MINE FIELD 
Once the method for calculation Pd was complete the next step was to generate 










Type of mine  Depth of mine (m) Loc_Width (m) Loc_Length (m) 
M  55.0  1080.437  28235.6 
M  51.0  816.420  28361.1 
M  52.0  755.663  60247.7 
B  88.0  974.473  20071.3 
D  7.5  538.710  39115.9 
B  88.0  992.843  5234.5 
B  88.0  2495.274  44011.0 
B  88.0  2542.438  31868.1 
M  29.0  1576.185  49112.1 
M  55.0  2889.577  9878.3 
 
Table 14. Minefield Generation Example 
The type of mine is assigned based on a random number compared to the 
P(Deployed) Mine Type on Table 4. Mine type uniform probability of deployment  The 
depth of the mine is a uniform random distribution between the max. and min. depths 
shown in Table 5. Drifting and moored mine depth boundaries The mine location 
within the minefield is a uniform random distribution between 0 and the maximum length 






C. SENSOR CALCULATIONS 
 















0.0 533.3 28235.6 549.862 4.980% 1 
0.0 533.3 28361.1 287.644 77.896% 0 
0.0 533.3 60247.7 228.330 92.654% 1 
0.0 533.3 20071.3 449.832 10.408% 0 
0.0 533.3 39115.9 9.195 99.994% 1 
0.0 533.3 5234.5 467.861 8.518% 0 
0.0 533.3 44011.0 1963.913 17.786% 0 
0.0 533.3 31868.1 2011.031 18.213% 0 
0.0 533.3 49112.1 1043.254 9.448% 0 
0.0 533.3 9878.3 2356.886 21.345% 0 
Table 15. Sensor Location Example 
Table 15 shows the location of the sensor as it passes through the minefield.  
Depth of sensor was assumed to be zero.  The location of the sensor was determined by 







Sensor (m) Loc_W (m) 
Sensor 1 0 533 
Sensor 2 0 1067 
Sensor 3 0 1600 
Sensor 4 0 2133 
Sensor 5 0 2667 
Table 16. Sensor Paths Through Minefield 
The length location of the sensor is the same as the mine length.  The assumption 
was that the highest probability of detection would occur when the mine-to-sensor 
distance was the smallest.  Since the length values are the same the sensor-to-mine 










Equation 6: Sensor-to-Mine Distance Calculation 
 
The probability of detection (Pd) was calculated using the method show in 
Equation 2 through Equation 5.  The mine detection calculation was done using a 
binominal distribution with 1 trial, the P(detect) column value, and a random number 













The afore mentioned sensor calculation examples shown are for sensor 1.  The 
process was repeated for the sensor 2 through 5.  The overall mine detection calculation 
was a comparison of all the sensors.  An individual mine was considered detected if at 
least one of the sensors detected it. 
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